BEIJING'S BROKEN PROMISES

The Wall Street Journal

August 20, 2001

Review & Outlook

It's tempting to believe U.S. relations with China entered a benign phase after Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Beijing several weeks ago. Mr. Powell displayed his usual diplomatic panache. Three U.S.-based scholars unjustly convicted on spying charges were released from detention. In the wake of Mr. Powell's departure, China played the trade card, announcing long-awaited approval of a $2 billion order for Boeing 737s. But it would be folly to think that Mr. Powell's high-profile trip had somehow transformed the delicate nature of U.S.-China relations.

On the horizon lie new troubles relating to Beijing's broken promises on the diplomatic front and its apparent determination to remain a weapons-technology lifeline for states with nuclear ambitions. One promise made by China in November was to stop exporting technology covered under the Missile Technology Control Regime to countries developing nuclear weapons such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. China isn't a signatory to the MTCR, but it pledged to adhere to MTCR parameters that apply to whole missiles or parts of missiles capable of carrying a 1,100-pound payload over 186 miles. But on May 1 a U.S. satellite spotted a shipment of parts for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missiles -- both of which can travel up to 1,240 miles and carry nuclear warheads -- as they crossed the Sino-Pakistani border.

To put it bluntly, China is fueling an arms race in South Asia. The danger here is that with Beijing's continued help, Pakistan is likely to succeed sooner rather than later in modernizing its nuclear arsenal with plutonium bombs and thus produce small and lighter warheads, which would result in longer effective ranges for its nuclear-armed missiles aimed at India and elsewhere. Moreover, Pakistan is also a proliferator, a conduit through which Chinese weapons technology has been fed to Iran, Libya and Iraq. For example, United Nations inspectors dismantling the Iraqi nuclear program after Desert Storm found evidence that the plan for Iraq's nuclear bomb was a Chinese design provided by Pakistan.

The other promise -- made to Mr. Powell himself by Chinese officials in private conversations only five months ago -- was that Chinese telecommunications companies would "cease and desist" helping Iraq upgrade its air-defense systems. But senior Bush officials recently announced the Chinese companies have continued their work, in violation of U.N. sanctions. Improving Iraqi military communications and air-defense systems threatens the ability of U.S. and allied aircraft to carry out their missions to patrol the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. And it threatens the ability of reconnaissance and surveillance planes to monitor Iraq's attempts to reinvigorate its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

If China's latest betrayals ring a bell it's because over the last decade a series of similar commitments by Beijing played no small part in sparking a serious debate in the U.S. about real threats to America's post-Cold War security. It was a debate that erupted into war between the Clinton Administration's state and commerce departments, on the one hand, and the intelligence and security agencies, on the other. President Clinton's decisions to wink at Beijing's broken promises helped Republican Party candidate George W. Bush define his national-security policy and win the White House. Unlike his predecessor, Mr. Bush isn't likely to look the other way on the newest infractions. Torn between the false choice of engagement or isolation, Mr. Clinton could never resolve the dilemma of how to advance the goals of combating proliferation and enhancing America's security while improving relations with China. When China was caught red-handed violating its promises to limit or cancel missile or missile-part exports, Mr. Clinton often chose to either ignore the evidence or take at face value the excuse that such transfers weren't under Chinese government control.

That was as fallacious an argument then as it is now; China's export-control system for dual-use equipment and technology is certainly weak, but the critical arms sales and technology transfers must have the approval of China's top leadership. It's difficult to see how Messrs. Bush and Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld can make any concessions on the issue of China's aid to Iraqi air-defenses. And if anything, by selling more dangerous missiles to Pakistan, China's leaders have now made it easier for Mr. Bush to build a consensus in Congress on the need for an allied missile-defense system that enhances security cooperation in Asia.

The challenge for the Bush Administration is to address China's missile sales without provoking a crisis both at home and in Beijing. Mr. Bush is sending his arms-control experts to the Chinese capital this week for talks. Already debate has begun in Congress over the utility of sanctions, which Mr. Bush can impose under U.S. law against the Chinese companies involved. Despite China's recent misdeeds, there are contrarians in Congress calling for a lighter approach, with some clamoring to reverse 1999 legislation that, citing risks to national security, made it more difficult for U.S. companies to export satellites to China. Whatever course the debate takes in the following weeks, Mr. Bush and the Congress should search constructively for policies that work to persuade China to behave in a manner consistent with international norms on nonproliferation, arms control and international trade. Relying on any more promises from Beijing would be a mistake.